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Abstract
The literature on judgment aggregation is moving from studying im-
possibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific
judgment aggregation rules. Here we give a structured list of most rules
that have been proposed and studied recently in the literature, together
with various properties of such rules. We first focus on the majority-
preservation property, which generalizes Condorcet-consistency, and iden-
tify which of the rules satisfy it. We study the inclusion relationships that
hold between the rules. Finally, we consider two forms of unanimity,
monotonicity, homogeneity, and reinforcement, and we identify which of
the rules satisfy these properties.
1 Introduction
Judgment aggregation studies the problems related to aggregating a finite set of
yes-no individual judgments, cast on a collection of logically interrelated issues.
Such a finite set of issues forms the agenda. It can be seen as a generalisation
of preference aggregation [4].
Until a few years ago, the judgment aggregation literature had focused con-
siderably more on studying impossibility theorems than on developing and in-
vestigating specific aggregation rules. This field development approach departs
from the, admittedly much older, field of voting theory. Nevertheless, several
recent and independent papers have started to explore the zoo of concrete judg-
ment aggregation rules, beyond the well known premise-based and conclusion-
based rules [8, 31]. While the premise- and conclusion-based rules can only be
applied if there exists a prior labelling of the agenda issues as premises and
conclusions, the following rules are defined for every agenda: quota-based rules
[5], distance-based rules [30, 25, 14, 9], generalizations of Condorcet-consistent
voting rules [28, 27, 21], and rules based on the maximisation of some scoring
function [21, 3, 36]. Some of these rules obviously generalize well-known voting
∗
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rules. However, a ‘compendium’ of existing judgment aggregation rules really
does not exist at the moment, despite the several overview papers, chapters and
even books that have been published in recent years [24, 18, 12, 1].
Our aim is threefold. First, as there is so far no compendium of judgment
aggregation rules, we give one: we list most of the rules that have been pro-
posed recently, in a structured way. This part of the paper does not give novel
results, but serves as a partial survey. Second, we compare in a systematic
way these rules in terms of inclusion relationships. Third, we consider a few
key properties that generalize properties of voting rules (majority-preservation,
unanimity, monotonicity, homogeneity and reinforcement) and identify those of
the considered rules that satisfy them.
We follow earlier work in judgment aggregation [23] in using a constraint-
based version of judgment aggregation to represent properties like transitivity
of preferences. As it is common in voting theory, we consider irresolute rules
(also called ‘correspondences’) rather than functions, that is, a rule outputs a
non-empty set of collective judgments.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The general definitions are given in
Section 2. In Section 3 we review the rules we study in the paper. Majority
preservation is a key property of rules, as it generalizes Condorcet-consistency.
We focus on majority-preservation in Section 4 and show which of the rules
defined in Section 3 satisfy it. In Section 5 we address inclusion and non-
inclusion relationships between our rules. In Section 6 we study the rules from
the point of view of unanimity, monotonicity, reinforcement and homogeneity.
We summarize our contributions in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
Let L be a standard propositional language consisting of well-formed proposi-
tional logical formulas, including ⊤ (tautology) and ⊥ (contradiction), together
with a standard notion of logical consistency. We denote atomic propositions
by p, q etc. and formulas from L by ϕ, α, β etc.
An agenda A is a finite set of propositions of the form {ϕ1,¬ϕ1, . . . , ϕm,
¬ϕm}, where for all i, ϕi ∈ L and ϕi is neither a tautology nor a contra-
diction, and is a non-negated formula, (i.e., it is not of the form ¬α).We re-
fer to a pair (ϕ,¬ϕ) as an issue. The pre-agenda [A] associated with A is
[A] = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm}. We slightly abuse notation and write ϕi instead of ¬¬ϕi
for ϕi ∈ [A].
An agenda is endowed with a notion of consistency which preserves logical
consistency. Formally, A comes with a set of (A-)consistent judgment sets; a
(A-)consistent judgment set is logically consistent, but the converse does not
necessarily hold. Without loss of generality, the agenda’s consistency notion is
defined as logical consistency given some fixed formula: a set of formulas S is
consistent if S ∪ {γ} is logically consistent, where γ is some exogenously fixed
non-contradictory formula, which we call the integrity constraint. This is also
the approach followed in [17] (albeit in the slightly different framework of binary
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aggregation, where agenda issues are atomic propositions) and in [13]. A similar
use of constraints is also done in belief merging theory [19, 16]. When γ is not
specified, by default it is equal to ⊤, in which case the notion of consistency
associated with the agenda coincides with standard logical consistency.
A judgment on ϕ ∈ [A] is either ϕ or ¬ϕ. A judgment set J for A is a subset
of A. J is complete if and only if for each ϕ ∈ [A], either ϕ ∈ J or ¬ϕ ∈ J . A
judgment set for A is rational if it is complete and consistent. Let JA be the
set of all rational judgment sets for A.
For every consistent S ⊆ A, the set of rational extensions of S, i.e., {J | J ∈
JA and S ⊆ J}, is denoted as ext(S).
A JA-profile, or simply a profile, is a finite sequence of rational individual
judgment sets, i.e., P = 〈J1, . . . , Jn〉 for some n, where Ji is the judgment set
of voter i. We slightly abuse notation and write J ∈ P when J = Ji for some i,
and we write |P | to denote the number of judgment sets in P . We sometimes
denote P as (Ji, J−i), where J−i = 〈Jj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i〉. We write Q ⊆ P
(read ”Q is a sub-profile of P ) if Q = 〈Jj |i ∈ I〉 for some I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
Given two rational judgment sets J and J ′ we define the Hamming distance
dH : dH(J, J
′) as the number of issues on which J and J ′ disagree. We also
define the Hamming distance between two profiles P = 〈J1, . . . , Jn〉 and P ′ =
〈J ′1, . . . , J
′
n〉 as DH(P, P
′) =
∑n
i=1 dH(Ji, J
′
i), and between a judgment set and
a profile as dH(J, P ) =
∑n
i=1 dH(J, Ji).
We define N(P, ϕ) as the number of all voters in P whose judgment set
contains ϕ, i.e., N(P, ϕ) = |{i | ϕ ∈ Ji, Ji ∈ P}|.
Example 1 Consider the pre-agenda [A] = {p∧ r, q, p∧ q}. The corresponding
agenda is A = {p∧r,¬(p∧r), q,¬q, p∧q,¬(p∧q)}, equipped with the consistency
notion corresponding to γ = (q → r). The set of rational judgment sets is
JA =
{
{¬(p ∧ r),¬q,¬(p ∧ q)}, {¬(p ∧ r), q,¬(p ∧ q)},
{(p ∧ r),¬q,¬(p ∧ q)}, {p ∧ r, q, p ∧ q}
}
Consider the profile P = 〈J1, J2, J3, J4〉 with J1 = J2 = {¬(p ∧ r), q,¬(p ∧ q)},
J3 = {p ∧ r,¬q,¬(p ∧ q)} and J4 = {p ∧ r, q, p ∧ q}. For instance, N(P, q) = 3.
Most often we will write profiles in a table, as in Table 1, with the pre-agenda
elements given in the topmost row and the voters’ judgment sets in the leftmost
column. If a judgment set contains ϕ ∈ [A] (respectively ¬ϕ), then we mark
this with a “+” (respectively, “-”) in the corresponding column. The constraint,
if explicitly defined, will be given in the table caption.
The majoritarian judgment set associated with profile P = 〈J1, . . . , Jn〉 con-
tains all the elements of the agenda that are supported by a strict majority
of judgment sets in P , i.e., m(P ) =
{
ϕ ∈ A | N(P, ϕ) > n2
}
. A profile P is
majority-consistent when m(P ) is a consistent subset of A.
An (irresolute) judgment aggregation rule F maps every profile P , defined on
every agenda A, to a nonempty set of rational judgment sets in JA. When for
all profiles P , F (P ) is a singleton, then F is said to be resolute. Like in voting
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theory, resolute rules can be defined from irresolute ones by coupling them with
a tie-breaking mechanism.
The preference pre-agendas associated with a set C = {x1, . . . , xq} of alter-
natives are defined by the set of atomic propositions {xiPxj | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q}
(when j > i, xjPxi is not an atomic proposition, but we write xjPxi as a
shorthand for ¬(xiPxj)) and one of these two consistency notions: transitivity,
defined as consistency with
Tr =
∧
i,j,k∈{1,...,q}
i6=j 6=k
(
xiPxj ∧ xjPxk → xiPxk
)
or existence of a nondominated alternative, defined as consistency with
W =
∨
i∈{1,...,q}
∧
j 6=i
xiPxj
Finally, ATrC (respectively, A
W
C ) is defined by its pre-agenda [A
Tr
C ] = {xiPxj |
1 ≤ i < j ≤ q} and the consistency notion corresponding to transitivity (re-
spectively, with the existence of a nondominated alternative).
A preference profile over C is a finite sequence of linear orders over C, which
we denote by V = 〈≻1, . . . ,≻n〉. The majority graph M(V ) associated with V
is the directed graph whose vertices are elements of C and containing edge (x, y)
if and only if a majority of voters in V prefer x to y; we denote by nV (x, y)
the number of votes in V that prefer x to y. A social preference function maps
every preference profile to a nonempty set of linear orders over C. A social choice
function (or voting rule) maps every preference profile to a nonempty subset of
C. With every judgment aggregation rule we can associate two social preference
functions, whether we impose the transitivity constraint or the nondominated
alternative constraint. From these two social preference functions we can derive
two social choice functions by “collecting” the nondominated elements in each
of the output preference relations. Sometimes, especially when n is odd, these
social preference functions or the social choice functions coincide with well-
known voting rules (we show several examples in Section 3).
3 Judgment aggregation rules
We now define five (overlapping) families of judgment aggregation rules. We
use the following running example throughout the paper to illustrate the rules.
Example 2 Let [A] = {p∧r, p∧s, q, p∧q, t}, and P the 17-voter profile of Table
1. Consistency in A is logical consistency. As m(P ) = {p∧r, p∧s, q,¬(p∧q), t}
is an inconsistent judgment set, P is not majority-consistent.
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Voters { p ∧ r, p ∧ s, q, p ∧ q, t }
J1 − J6 + + + + +
J7 − J10 + + - - +
J11 − J17 - - + - -
m(P) + + + - +
Table 1: Running example profile.
3.1 Rules based on the majoritarian judgment set
A judgment aggregation rule F is based on the majoritarian judgment set when
for every two JA-profiles P and P ′ such that m(P ) = m(P ′), we have F (P ) =
F (P ′). These rules can be viewed as the judgment aggregation counterparts of
voting rules based on the pairwise majority graph, also known as C1 rules in
Fishburn’s classification (see, e.g., [2]).
Given a set of formulas S ⊆ A, S′ ⊆ S is a maximal consistent subset of S if
and only if S′ is consistent and there exists no other consistent set S′′ such that
S′ ⊂ S′′ ⊆ S; and S′ ⊆ S is a maxcard (for “maximal cardinality”) consistent
subset of S if and only if S′ is consistent and there exists no other consistent
set S′′ ⊆ S such that |S′′| > |S′|. The set of maximal (respectively, maxcard)
consistent subsets of S is denoted by max(S,⊆) (respectively, max(S, |.|)).
Definition 1 (Maximal Condorcet and maxcard Condorcet rules) For
every JA-profile P , the maximal Condorcet rule (mc) and the maxcard Con-
dorcet rule (mcc) are defined as follows:
mc(P ) = {ext(S) | S ∈ max(m(P ),⊆)}, (1)
mcc(P ) = {ext(S) | S ∈ max(m(P ), |.|)}. (2)
Equivalently, mcc(P ) = argmax
J∈JA
|J ∩m(P )|. Clearly, mcc(P ) ⊆ mc(P ).
Example 3 For the profile P of Example 2, the maximal consistent subsets of
m(P ) are {p∧r, p∧s, q, t}, {p∧r, p∧s,¬(p∧q), t} and {q,¬(p∧q), t}; therefore
mc(P ) =


{p ∧ r, p ∧ s, q, p ∧ q, t},
{p ∧ r, p ∧ s, ¬q, ¬(p ∧ q), t},
{¬(p ∧ r), ¬(p ∧ s), q, ¬(p ∧ q), t}


and
mcc(P ) =
{
{p ∧ r, p ∧ s, q, p ∧ q, t},
{p ∧ r, p ∧ s, ¬q, ¬(p ∧ q), t}
}
.
The output of the rule mc is called Condorcet admissible set by Nehring et
al. [28]. The rule mcc is called Slater rule [28], and EndpointdH [25].
At least when n is odd, it is easy to identify the voting rules obtained from
mc and mcc. We give these results informally and without proof:1
1The proofs can be found in [22].
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• For mcc, the transitivity constraint leads to the social preference function
that maps a profile to the set of all its Slater orders, i.e., the set of all
linear orders ≻ over C maximising the number of (x, y) such that x ≻ y if
and only if (x, y) ∈ M(V ), and that the corresponding voting rule (for n
odd) is the Slater rule, which maps a profile V to the set of all alternatives
that are dominating in some Slater order for M(V ). If we choose the W
constraint, then the corresponding voting rule (for n odd) is the Copeland
rule, which maps a profile to the set of alternatives x maximising the
number of outgoing edges from x in M(V ).
• For mc, the transitivity constraint (for n odd) leads to the top cycle rule,
which maps a preference profile to the (unique) smallest subset S of C
such that for every x ∈ S and y ∈ C \S, we have (x, y) ∈M(V ).2 Finally,
the choice of the W constraint (for n odd) leads to the voting rule that
maps a profile to its Condorcet winner if and only if the profile has a
Condorcet winner, and to the set of all alternatives otherwise.
3.2 Rules based on the weighted majoritarian set
The weighted majoritarian set associated with a profile P is the function N(P, .)
which, we recall, maps each agenda issue to the number of judgment sets in
P that contain it. A judgment aggregation rule F is based on the weighted
majoritarian set when for every two JA-profiles P and P ′, if for every ϕ ∈ A
we have N(P, ϕ) = N(P ′, ϕ), then F (P ) = F (P ′). These rules can be viewed
as the judgment aggregation counterparts of voting rules that are based on
the weighted pairwise majority graph, also known as C2 rules in Fishburn’s
classification [2]. Since m(P ) can be recovered from N(P, .), every rule based
on the majoritarian judgment set is also based on the weighted majoritarian
set.
Definition 2 (Median rule) For every JA-profile P , the median rule (med)
is defined as follows:
med(P ) = argmax
J∈JA
∑
ϕ∈J
N(P, ϕ). (3)
This rule appears in many places under different names: Prototype [25],
median rule [28], maximum weighted agenda rule [21], simple scoring rule [3]
and distance-based procedure [14]. Variants of this rule have been defined by
Konieczny and Pino-Pe´rez [19] and Pigozzi [30]. For completeness we give here
the equivalent distance-based formulation of med, although we consider more
generally the family of distance-based rules in Section 3.4. For every JA-profile
P , the distance-based rule F dH ,Σ is defined as follows:
F dH ,Σ(P ) = argmin
J∈JA
∑
Ji∈P
dH(Ji, J). (4)
2This result has been independently proven (and stated in a stronger way) in [28].
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It is not difficult to establish that F dH ,Σ coincides with med (see [21], and
Proposition 1 in [3]). The social preference function obtained from med and the
choice of the transitivity constraint is the Kemeny social preference function,
and the corresponding voting rule is the Kemeny rule.
Example 4 Consider the agenda and profile of Example 2. We obtain:
N(P, p ∧ r)=10 N(P,¬(p ∧ r))=7 N(P, p ∧ s)=10 N(P,¬(p ∧ s))=7
N(P, q) = 13 N(P,¬q) = 4 N(P, p ∧ q)=6 N(P,¬(p ∧ q))=11
N(P, t) = 10 N(P,¬t) = 7
As
∑
ϕ∈J
N(P, ϕ) reaches its maximum value (49) for {p ∧ r, p ∧ s, q, p ∧ q, t}, we
have med(P ) = {{p ∧ r, p ∧ s, q, p ∧ q, t}}.
The following rule generalizes the ranked pairs voting rule [33]. It proceeds
by considering the elements ϕ of the agenda in non-increasing order of N(P, ϕ)
and fixing each agenda issue value to the majoritarian value if it does not lead
to an inconsistency.
Definition 3 (Ranked agenda rule) Let A = {ψ1, . . . , ψ2m}. For every
JA-profile P , ra consists of those judgment sets J ∈ JA for which there exists
a permutation (ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕ2m) of the propositions in A such that N(P, ϕ1) ≥
N(P, ϕ2) ≥ · · · ≥ N(P, ϕ2m) and J is obtained by the following algorithmic
procedure:
S := ∅
for k = 1, . . . , 2m do
if S ∪ {ϕk} is consistent then S ← S ∪ {ϕk}
end if
end for
J := S
In plain words, ra assigns iteratively a truth value to each proposition of
the agenda, whenever it does not produce an inconsistency with propositions
already assigned, following an order compatible with N(P, .). An equivalent
non-procedural definition is the following: for every profile P , define >RAP by:
J >RAP J
′ if there is an α ∈ N such that
1. for all ψ ∈ A, N(P, ψ) > α implies [ψ ∈ J if and only if ψ ∈ J ′], and
2. J ∩ {ϕ | N(P, ϕ) = α} ⊃ J ′ ∩ {ϕ | N(P, ϕ) = α}.
Then ra(P ) = {J ∈ JA | J undominated in >RAP }.
3
Example 5 Consider the profile of Example 2. The highest value of N(P, ϕ) is
reached for q, therefore q is fixed first. Then comes ¬(p ∧ q), which is fixed as
well. Then come p∧ r and p∧ s, tied. We skip both because they would produce
inconsistencies; then t is fixed, and finally, ¬(p ∧ r) and ¬(p ∧ s). Thus,
ra(P ) = {{q,¬(p ∧ q), t,¬(p ∧ r),¬(p ∧ s)}}.
3The proof—almost straightforward—can be found in [20].
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The leximax rule [27, 15] is a refinement of ra. We repeat the definition
of leximax here using our terminology.
Definition 4 Given an n-voter profile P and a rational judgment set J , define
Sk(P ) = {ϕ ∈ A | N(P, ϕ) = k,
n
2 ≤ k ≤ n} and sk(J, P ) = |Sk(P ) ∩ J |. Given
two rational judgment sets J, J ′, let J >leximaxP J
′ if and only if there is a k ∈
{n2 , . . . , n} such that sk(J, P ) > sk(J
′, P ) and for all i > k, si(J, P ) = si(J
′, P ).
leximax(P ) is the set of all undominated rational judgment sets in with respect
to >leximaxP .
For the profile P of Example 2: S13(P ) = {q}, S12(P ) = ∅, S11(P ) =
{¬(p ∧ q)}, S10(P ) = {p ∧ r, p ∧ s, t}. If J = {¬(p ∧ r),¬(p ∧ s), q,¬(p ∧ q), t}
and J ′ = {p∧r, p∧s, q, p∧q, t}, we have s13(J, P ) = s13(J ′, P ) = 1, s12(J, P ) =
s12(J
′, P ) = 0, s11(J, P ) = 0 and s11(J
′, P ) = 1, therefore J >leximaxP J
′. (In
fact, J is the only >leximaxP -undominated rational judgment set.)
It is easy to see that the social preference function (respectively, voting rule)
associated with ra and the transitivity constraint is the ranked pairs social
preference function (respectively, rule), which informally proceeds by iteratively
fixing edges in the majority graph, whenever possible, considering all ordered
pairs of alternatives (x, y) in an order corresponding to non-increasing values of
nV (x, y), and outputs the rankings obtained this way (respectively, the domi-
nating elements in these rankings). However, the voting rule associated with
ra and the W constraint is the maximin rule, that maps a profile V to the set
of alternatives that maximise min
y∈C\{x}
nV (x, y). The voting rules associated with
leximax are refinements of ranked pairs and maximin.
3.3 Rules based on elementary changes in profiles
The next family of rules we consider contains rules that are based on minimal
set of changes on a profile needed to render the profile majority-consistent. This
family of judgment rules can be viewed as the judgment aggregation counterpart
of voting rules that are rationalisable by some distance with respect to the
Condorcet consensus class [11].
The first rule we consider is called the Young rule for judgment aggregation,
by analogy with the Young voting rule, which outputs the candidate c min-
imising the number of voters to remove from the profile so that c becomes a
weak Condorcet winner [34]. The judgment aggregation generalization consists
of removing a minimal number of voters so that the profile becomes majority-
consistent, or equivalently, to look for majority-consistent subprofiles of maxi-
mum cardinality.
Definition 5 (Young rule) For every JA-profile P ,
y(P ) = {ext(m(Q)) | Q ∈ argmax
Q⊆P,
m(Q) is A-consistent
|Q|}. (5)
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Example 6 Once again we consider A and P from Example 2. After noticing
that removing three judgment sets from {J1, . . . , J6} restores majority-consistency,
and removing less than three judgment sets does not, we obtain
y(P ) = ext({q,¬(p ∧ q)}) =
{
{¬(p ∧ r), ¬(p ∧ s), q, ¬(p ∧ q), t},
{¬(p ∧ r), ¬(p ∧ s), q, ¬(p ∧ q), ¬t}
}
.
The voting rule associated with y and the W constraint is the Young voting
rule [22].
The next rule we define looks for a minimal number of individual judgment
reversals in the profile so that P becomes majority-consistent, where a judgment
reversal is a change of truth value of one agenda element in one individual
judgment set. This rule has been proposed first in Miller and Osherson [25]
under the name fulld. It bears a resemblance with the Dodgson voting rule,
but does not exactly correspond to it when choosing either the Tr or the W
constraint.
Definition 6 (Minimal profile change rule) For P ∈ J nA , the mpc rule is
defined as:
mpc(P ) = {ext(m(Q)) | Q ∈ argmin
Q∈Jn
A
m(Q) is A-consistent
DH(P,Q)}.
Example 7 Consider the agenda A and profile P of Example 2. Profile P ′
given in Table 2 is the closest majority-consistent profile to P with DH(P, P
′) =
3 (the grey cell indicates the judgments reversed from P ). We obtain mpc(P ) =
{{p ∧ r, p ∧ s, q, p ∧ q, t}}.
Voters {p ∧ r p ∧ s q p ∧ q t}
J1 − J6 + + + + +
J7 − J10 + + - - +
J11 − J14 - - + - -
J15 − J17 - - + + -
m(P ′) + + + + +
Table 2: The profile at minimal DH distance from the profile P in Table 1.
3.4 Rules based on (pseudo-)distances
For a given constrained agenda, a pseudo-distance d on JA is a function that
maps pairs of judgment sets to non-negative real numbers, and that satisfies,
for all J, J ′ ∈ JA, d(J, J ′) = d(J ′, J), and d(J, J ′) = 0 if and only if J = J ′.
Two pseudo-distances we will use are the Hamming distance dH , defined in
Section 2, and the geodesic distance4 on JA, defined in [9] as follows. Given
4Our name; no name was given of this distance in [9].
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three distinct rational judgment sets J, J ′, J ′′, we say that J is between J ′ and
J ′′ if J ′∩J ′′ ⊂ J . Let GA be the graph whose set of vertices is the set of rational
judgment sets JA and that contains an edge between J ′ and J ′′ if and only if
there exists no J ∈ JA, J ′ 6= J 6= J ′′, between J ′ and J ′′. Finally, dG(J ′, J ′′) is
defined as the length of the shortest path between J ′ and J ′′ in GA.
Definition 7 Let d be a pseudo-distance on JA and ⋆ a commutative, associa-
tive and non-decreasing function on R+. The distance-based judgment aggrega-
tion rule F d,⋆ associated with d and ⋆ is defined as
F d,⋆(P ) = argmin
J∈JA
⋆ (d(J1, J), . . . , d(Jn, J)) (6)
In addition to F dH ,Σ we focus on two specific distance-based judgment ag-
gregation rules: F dG,Σ, defined in [9], and F dH ,max, defined in [19, 21]. From
now on, we will use the word ‘distance’ instead of ‘pseudo-distance’ although
our rules can be defined more generally for pseudo-distances.
3.5 Scoring rules
Dietrich [3] defines a general class of scoring rules for judgment aggregation.
Given a function s : JA ×A → R
+, the rule Fs is defined as
Fs(P ) = argmax
J∈JA
∑
ϕ∈J
∑
Ji∈P
s(Ji, ϕ). (7)
The med rule (3) is a scoring rule (and also a distance-based rule).
The reversal score function rev [3] is defined as:
rev(J, ϕ) = min
J′∈JA, ϕ/∈J′
dH(J, J
′). (8)
The main motivation for introducing this rule is that the associated voting
rule (with the transitivity constraint) is the Borda rule. Dietrich [3] defines four
other scoring rules (entailment scoring, disjoint entailment scoring, minimal
entailment scoring, and irreducible entailment scoring), two of which generalize
the Borda rule as well. As he focuses on reversal scoring, we do as well, and
leave the other four for further study beyond this paper.
Duddy et al. [10] introduce another interesting and intriguing scoring rule
(defined only when the agenda satisfies a specific property); it generalizes not
only the Borda rule, but also a well-behaved mean rule for finding collective
dichotomies. We leave it for further study as well.
4 Majority-preservation
Intuitively, a judgment aggregation rule F is majority-preserving if and only if
F returns only the extensions of the majoritarian judgment set whenever it is
consistent. In case of ties, a majoritarian set can have more than one extension.
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For example, when we have agenda A = {p,¬p, q,¬q} and individual judgments
J1 = {p, q} and J2 = {p,¬q}, then m(〈J1, J2〉) = {p}, which can be extended
into two complete collective judgment sets, namely {p,¬q} and {p, q}.
Definition 8 A judgment aggregation rule F is majority-preserving if and only
if for every agenda A and for every majority-consistent JA-profile P we have
F (P ) = ext(m(P )). A rule F is weakly majority-preserving if and only if
for every agenda A and for every majority-consistent JA-profile P we have
F (P ) ⊇ ext(m(P )).
Applied to the preference agenda with the transitivity constraint, majority-
preserving coincides with the requirement that a social welfare function should
return the pairwise majority ordering whenever it is transitive; applied to the
W constraint, it coincides with the requirement that a social welfare function
should return the pairwise majority ordering whenever it has a dominating
element, i.e., whenever there is a Condorcet winner (which is slightly stronger
than Condorcet-consistency).
Proposition 1 mc, mcc, med, ra, leximax, y and mpc are
majority-preserving. F dG,Σ and Frev are not even weakly majority-preserving.
Proof. Obvious cases are mc, mcc, med, ra, leximax, y and mpc. For Frev,
which coincides with the Borda rule for the preference agenda and the transitiv-
ity constraint, the result follows from the well-known fact that the Borda rule
is not Condorcet-consistent. For F dG,Σ, consider the profile P in Table 3.
Voters {p, q, r, p↔ q, p↔ r, q ↔ r}
J1, J2 + + + + + +
J3, J4, J5 - + + - - +
J6, J7 + - + - + -
J8, J9 + + - + - -
J10, J11 - - - + + +
m(P ) + + + + + +
Table 3: A profile showing F dG,Σ is not majority-preserving.
There are eight rational judgment sets over A, i.e., |JA| = 8. We check that
for every J, J ′ ∈ JA, if J 6= J ′ then dG(J, J ′) = 1. Therefore,
∑
Ji∈P
dG(J3, Ji) =
8. Now,
∑
Ji∈P
dG(J, Ji) = 9 for every J ∈ {J1, J6, J8, J10} and
∑
Ji∈P
dG(J, Ji) =11
for every J ∈ (JA \ {J1, J3, J6, J8, J10}). Therefore, F dG,Σ(P ) = {J3} although
P is majority-consistent and m(P ) = J1.

Let us call a pseudo-distance non-degenerate when there exist J, J ′, J ′′ such
that d(J, J ′′) > max(d(J, J ′), d(J ′, J ′′)). Note that dH is non-degenerate.
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Proposition 2 For every distance d, the rule F d,max is not majority-preserving.
If d is non-degenerate then F d,max is not weakly majority-preserving.
Proof. Let J1, J2 be two distinct judgment sets such that d(J1, J2) ≤ d(J, J ′)
for all J 6= J ′. Let P = 〈J1, J1, J2〉. P is majority-consistent, with m(P ) = J1,
and yet F d,max(P ) contains also J2, therefore F
d,max is not majority-preserving.
If moreover d is non-degenerate, let J1, J2, J3 be three judgment sets such that
d(J1, J3) > max(d(J1, J2), d(J2, J3)). Let P = 〈J1, J2, J3, J3, J3〉. P is majority-
consistent, with m(P ) = J3, and yet F
d,max(P ) = {J2}, therefore F
d,max is not
weakly majority-preserving. 
Corollary 1 F dH ,max is not weakly majority-preserving.
5 Inclusion relationships between the rules
We now establish the following (non)inclusion relationships between most of
the rules introduced so far. As the case-by-case proof is long and not very
interesting, we chose to have it in the Appendix.
Definition 9 Given two judgment aggregation rules F1 and F2, we denote:
• F1 ⊆ F2 when F1(P ) ⊆ F2(P ) holds for every agenda A and every JA-
profile P .
• F1 ⊂ F2 when F1 ⊆ F2 and F1 6= F2.
• F1 inc F2 when neither F1 ⊆ F2 nor F2 ⊆ F1.
Let F1 ∈ {F dG,Σ, Frev, F dH ,max} and F2 be majority-preserving. Note that
F1 is not weakly majority-preserving, and that the counterexamples given in
Section 4 all have an odd n. If n is odd (recall that m(P ) is then a complete
judgment set) then there is a majority-consistent profile P for which m(P ) /∈
F1(P ), and F2(P ) = {m(P )}. This implies that F1 inc F2. Therefore, we have
an incomparability relationship between a rule in {F dG,Σ, Frev, F
dH ,max} and a
rule in {mc,mcc,med,ra, leximax,y,mpc}.
Proposition 3 The inclusion and incomparability relations among the majority-
preserving rules, and among the non majority-preserving rules, are represented
on Tables 4 and 5; a ⊃ sign for row F1 and column F2 means that F1 ⊃ F2,
and an inc sign, that F1 inc F2.
6 Unanimity, monotonicity, homogeneity, rein-
forcement
In preference aggregation, there are three classes of properties [37]: those that
are satisfied by most common rules (such as neutrality or anonymity); those
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mcc med ra leximax y mpc
mc ⊃ ⊃ ⊃ ⊃ inc inc
mcc inc inc inc inc inc
med inc inc inc inc
ra ⊃ inc inc
leximax inc inc
y inc
Table 4: (Non)inclusion relationships between the majority-preserving rules.
F dG,Σ Frev
F dH ,max inc inc
F dG,Σ inc
Table 5: (Non)inclusion relationships between the other rules.
that are very hard to satisfy, and whose satisfaction, under mild additional
condition, implies impossibility results; and finally, those that are satisfied by
a significant number of rules and violated by another significant number of
rules. Similarly, in judgment aggregation, weak properties such as anonymity
are satisfied by all our rules, while strong properties such as independence are
violated by all our rules. We have already studied an “intermediate” property:
majority-preservation. Here we consider four more: unanimity, monotonicity,
homogeneity and reinforcement.
6.1 Unanimity
Unanimity has been defined for resolute rules by Dietrich and List [7]: F is
said to satisfy unanimity when for every JA-profile P = 〈J1, . . . , Jn〉 and every
ϕ ∈ A, if ϕ ∈ Ji for all i ≤ n, then ϕ ∈ F (P ).5 We first generalise unanimity to
irresolute rules, which gives us a weak and a strong version of unanimity.
Definition 10 (Weak and strong unanimity) Given ϕ ∈ A, the JA-profile
P is said to be ϕ-unanimous when ϕ ∈ Ji for every Ji ∈ P .
• F satisfies weak unanimity when for every ϕ-unanimous profile P , there
is a J ∈ F (P ) such that ϕ ∈ J .
• F satisfies strong unanimity when for every ϕ-unanimous profile P , for
all J ∈ F (P ) we have ϕ ∈ J .
Proposition 4 mcc, med, F dH ,max, mpc, F dG,Σ and Frev do not even satisfy
weak unanimity.
Proof.
5A weaker unanimity property has been defined by List and Puppe [24], for resolute rules
as well: F (P ) = J whenever all the voters in P have the judgment set J .
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1. mcc, med and mpc: The proof that med does not satisfy weak unanimity
can be found in [31]. For mcc and mpc consider the profile P from
Table 6. mcc(P ), and mpc(P ) coincide: mcc(P ) = mpc(P ) = {¬p, p →
Voters p p→ q ∨ r q r p→ s ∨ t s t p→ u ∨ v u v
J1 + + + - + + - + + -
J2 + + - + + - + + - +
J3 + - - - - - - - - -
m(P) + + - - + - - + - -
Table 6: A profile showing that mcc(P ) and mpc(P ) do not satisfy weak una-
nimity.
(q∨r),¬q,¬r, p → (s∨t),¬s,¬t, p→ (u∨v),¬u,¬v}. mpc(P ) is obtained
by reversing two p judgments in either two of the three judgment sets of
the profile.
2. F dH ,max: Let [A] = {p, q, r, s, α}, where α = (p ∧ q ∧ r ∧ s) ∨ (¬p ∧
¬q ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬s), and P = 〈J1, J2〉 where J1 = {p, q, r, s, α} and J2 =
{¬p,¬q,¬r,¬s, α}. F dH ,max(P ) selects all J ∈ JA for whichmax(dH(J, J1), dH(J, J2)) =
3. For all such J it holds that α 6∈ J , although there is unanimity on α.
3. F dG,Σ. Let [A] = {p1, p2, . . . , p13} with JA as given in Table 7.
Sets { p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, p9, p10, p11, p12 p13 }
J1 + - - + - - + - - + - - +
J2 + + - + + - + + - + + - +
J3 - + - - + - - + - - + - +
J4 - + + - + + - + + - + + +
J5 - - + - - + - - + - - + +
J6 + - + + - + + - + + - + +
J7 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 7: The JA for the example demonstrating that F dG,Σ does not satisfy
weak unanimity.
Consider the profile P = 〈J1, J2, J3〉, where J1 = J1, J2 = J3, and J3 =
J5. We have that F dG,Σ(P ) = {J7}, although there is unanimity on p13.
The dG distances between each set in J are given in Table 8.
4. Frev. Consider a pre-agenda of [A] = {p1, p2, . . . , p13} with JA as given
in Table 9. Consider the profile P = 〈J1, J2, J3〉 where J1 = J , J2 = J ′,
and J3 = J
′′. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 13, we have that rev(Ji, pj) = 5
and rev(Ji,¬pj) = 8. We have that Frev(P ) = {J4} since the score of J4
for P is 192, while the score of each of the profile judgment sets to P is
163.
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dG(., .) J
1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7
J1 0 1 2 3 2 1 1
J2 1 0 1 2 3 2 2
J3 2 1 0 1 2 3 1
J4 3 2 1 0 1 2 2
J5 2 3 2 1 0 1 1
J6 1 2 3 2 1 0 2
J7 1 2 1 2 1 2 0
Table 8: The dG distances among the sets in JA from Table 7.
.
Sets { p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, p9, p10, p11, p12 p13 }
J1 + - - + - - + - - + - - +
J2 - + - - + - - + - - + - +
J3 - - + - - + - - + - - + +
J4 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 9: The JA for the example demonstrating that Frev does not satisfy weak
unanimity.

This failure of Frev to satisfy unanimity is a surprising result, because the
Borda social preference function (which ranks alternatives in a way consistent
with their Borda scores) satisfies Pareto-efficiency.
Proposition 5 mc satisfies weak unanimity but not strong unanimity.
Proof. Let P be a ϕ-unanimous JA-profile for some ϕ ∈ A. Note that for
each ψ ∈ m(P ), there exists at least one S ∈ max(m(P ),⊆) such that ψ ∈ S.
Consequently there exists a judgment set in mc(P ) that contains ϕ.
As a counter-example for mc satisfying strong unanimity, consider the pro-
file P of Table 6 mc does not satisfy strong unanimity since there exists J ∈
mc(P ) such that ¬p ∈ J . Namely, {¬p,¬(p → (q ∨ r)),¬q,¬r,¬(p → (s ∨
t)),¬s,¬t,¬(p→ (u ∨ v)),¬u,¬v} ∈ mc(P )6. 
Proposition 6 ra, leximax and y satisfy strong unanimity.
Proof. For ra and leximax: Let P be a profile and S ⊆ A be the subset of the
agenda consisting of all ϕ ∈ A for which P is ϕ-unanimous. Because individual
judgment sets are consistent, the conjunction of all elements of S is consistent.
6mc failing to satisfy strong unanimity is also a consequence of Theorem 2.2 in [29], which
can be reformulated as: mc satisfies strong unanimity if and only if A does not contain a
minimal inconsistent subset of size 3 or more.
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Now, when computing ra(P ), the elements of S are considered first, and what-
ever the order in which they are considered, they are included in the resulting
judgment set because no inconsistency arises. Therefore, for all ϕ ∈ S and all
J ∈ ra(P ), we have ϕ ∈ J . Since leximax ⊂ ra, leximax satisfies strong
unanimity as well.
For y: If ϕ is unanimously accepted in P , it is also unanimously accepted in ev-
ery majority-consistent subprofile of P and in its majoritarian judgment set. 
6.2 Monotonicity
In voting, monotonicity states that when the position of the winning alternative
improves in some vote ceteris paribus, then this alternative remains the winner.
We define below a generalisation of this property for (irresolute) judgment ag-
gregation rules. It is a generalization of the monotonicity property defined by
Dietrich and List [6] for resolute rules.
Definition 11 (Monotonicity)
Let P, P ′ ∈ J nA be two profiles, and ϕ ∈ A. P
′ is a ϕ-improvement of P when
(a) P = (Ji, J−i), (b) P
′ = (J ′i , J−i), (c) ¬ϕ ∈ Ji, (d) ϕ ∈ J
′
i, and (e) for all
ψ ∈ A, ψ 6∈ {ϕ,¬ϕ}, ψ ∈ Ji if and only if ψ ∈ J ′i . (Note that the definition
implies that J ′i is consistent, otherwise P
′ would not be a well-defined profile.)
A judgment aggregation rule F is monotonic, when for every P ∈ J nA and its
ϕ-improvement P ′ ∈ J nA , for any ϕ ∈ A, it holds that: if ϕ ∈ J for every
J ∈ F (P ), then ϕ ∈ J ′ for every J ′ ∈ F (P ′).
Note that not every profile has a ϕ-improvement for a given ϕ ∈ A: in
Example 1, {p∧r,¬q,¬(p∧q)} is a p∧r-improvement of {¬(p∧r),¬q,¬(p∧q)},
but {p∧r, q, p∧q} has no ψ-improvement7 for every ψ ∈ {¬(p∧r),¬q,¬(p∧q)}.
In all the proofs of this section, A is an agenda, ϕ an element of A, P =
(Ji, P−i) a JA-profile, and P
′ = (J ′i , P−i) a ϕ-improvement of P .
We start by proving the following lemmas, which will be useful for rules
based on the majoritarian judgment set.
Lemma 1 Let P a profile and P ′ a ϕ-improvement of P . Then one of the
following three statements is true:
1. m(P ′) = m(P );
2. ¬ϕ ∈ m(P ) and m(P ′) = m(P ) \ {¬ϕ};
3. ϕ /∈ m(P ) and m(P ′) = (m(P ) \ {¬ϕ}) ∪ {ϕ}.
7Recall that there is a constraint γ = q → r for the agenda in this example.
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Proof. If P ′ is a ϕ-improvement of P then N(P ′, ϕ) = N(P, ϕ) + 1 and for all
ψ ∈ A\{ϕ,¬ϕ}, N(P ′, ψ) = N(P, ψ). Table 10 represents the different possible
cases concerning the presence or not of ϕ and ¬ϕ in m(P ) andm(P ′), and which
of the three statements 1, 2 and 3 holds. Obviously, the columns = n2 − 1 and
= n2 are relevant only when n is even, and the column =
(n−1)
2 is relevant only
when n is odd. In all cases, one of 1, 2 and 3 holds. 
N(P, ϕ) < n2 − 1 =
n
2 − 1 =
n−1
2 =
n
2 >
n
2
m(P ) ∩ {ϕ,¬ϕ} {¬ϕ} {¬ϕ} {¬ϕ} ∅ {ϕ}
N(P ′, ϕ) < n2 =
n
2 =
n+1
2 =
n
2 + 1 >
n
2
m(P ′) ∩ {ϕ,¬ϕ} {¬ϕ} ∅ {ϕ} {ϕ} {ϕ}
statement holding 1 2 3 3 1
Table 10: Different possible cases concerning the presence or not of ϕ and ¬ϕ
in m(P ) and m(P ′)
Lemma 2 Given a consistent judgment set J , if every rational extension of J
contains ϕ, then (a) J does not contain ¬ϕ and (b) ext(J ∪ {ϕ}) = ext(J).
Proof. Assume that every rational extension of J contains ϕ. A complete ex-
tension of J containing ¬ϕ would contain both ϕ and ¬ϕ and would not be
consistent, hence (a) holds. For (b): because every rational extension of J con-
tains ϕ, every rational extension of J is also a rational extension of J ∪ {ϕ},
and obviously a rational extension of J ∪ {ϕ} is also a rational extension of J
Lemma 3 connects the monotonicity property with orders ≻P that rank the
judgment sets in JA with respect to given profile P ∈ J nA. We consider the rules
F which select as collective judgments for P ∈ J nA the undominated J ∈ JA
based on some order ≻P . This is condition (c) in Lemma 3. Such rules satisfy
monotonicity when the order ≻P satisfies two properties. Intuitively, conditions
(a) and (b) of Lemma 3, say that when going from ≻P to ≻P ′ , judgment sets
containing ϕ (respectively ¬ϕ) can only move “upward” (respectively “down-
ward”) in the preference relation.
Lemma 3 Let F be a judgment aggregation rule such that there is a family
of partial orders (≻P )P∈J n
A
over JA such that for every profile P , every ϕ-
improvement P ′ of P , and all J, J ′ ∈ JA,
(a) if [ϕ ∈ J if and only if ϕ ∈ J ′], then [J ≻P J ′ implies J ≻P ′ J ′];
(b) if [ϕ ∈ J and ¬ϕ ∈ J ′], then [J ≻P J ′ implies J ≻P ′ J ′];
and such that
(c) F (P ) is the set of all J ∈ JA such that there is no J ′ ∈ JA with J ′ ≻P J .
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Then F satisfies monotonicity.
Proof. Assume F satisfies the conditions of the lemma. Let P ∈ JA, P ′ a ϕ
improvement of P , and assume that (d) for all J ∈ F (P ) we have ϕ ∈ J .
Let J ′ /∈ F (P ). From a repeated application of (c), we obtain that there is
a J ∈ F (P ) such that J ≻P J
′. From (d), we have ϕ ∈ J . If ϕ ∈ J ′ then from
(a) and (c), we get J ≻P ′ J ′; if ϕ /∈ J ′ then from (b) and (c), we get J ≻P ′ J ′;
therefore, in all cases, J ′ /∈ F (P ′). We have shown that F (P ′) ⊆ F (P ), which
together with (d) implies that for all J ∈ F (P ′) we have ϕ ∈ J , from which we
conclude that F satisfies monotonicity. 
Proposition 7 mc, mcc, med, ra and leximax satisfy monotonicity.
Proof. In all cases, the proof comes from an application of Lemma 3, with a
suitable family of orders in each case.
• for mc, ≻P is defined by J ≻P J ′ if and only if J ∩m(P ) ⊃ J ′ ∩m(P ).
• for mcc, ≻P is defined by J ≻P J ′ if and only if |J ∩m(P )| > |J ′∩m(P )|.
• for med, ≻P is defined by J ≻P J ′ if
∑
ψ∈J N(P, ψ) >
∑
ψ∈J′ N(P, ψ).
• for ra, ≻P is >raP as defined in Section 3.
• for leximax, ≻P is >leximaxP as defined in Section 3.
We give the proof that the conditions of the lemma are satisfied for mc (the
other cases are similar).
It comes directly from the definition of the rule that (c) holds. Let P ′ be a
ϕ-improvement of P . Then one of the three conditions of Lemma 1 holds.
1. If m(P ′) = m(P ), then (a) and (b) obviously hold.
2. Assume ¬ϕ ∈ m(P ) and m(P ′) = m(P ) \ {¬ϕ}. Let J, J ′ such that
J ≻P J ′, that is,
J ∩m(P ) ⊃ J ′ ∩m(P ). (9)
(i) if ϕ belongs to both J and J ′, then ¬ϕ belongs to neither. Then
J ∩ m(P ′) = J ∩ m(P ), J ′ ∩ m(P ′) = J ′ ∩ m(P ), and (9) implies
J ≻P ′ J ′.
(ii) if ¬ϕ belongs to both J and J ′, then J ∩m(P ′) = (J ∩m(P ))\ {¬ϕ}
and J ′∩m(P ′) = (J ′∩m(P ))\{¬ϕ}, and then (9) implies J∩m(P ′) ⊃
J ′ ∩m(P ′), that is, J ≻P ′ J ′.
(iii) assume ϕ belongs to J but not to J ′; then ¬ϕ /∈ J , which together
with ¬ϕ ∈ m(P ) and (9) implies ¬ϕ /∈ J ′, therefore ϕ ∈ J ′, contra-
diction.
3. Assume ϕ /∈ m(P ) and m(P ′) = (m(P ) \ {¬ϕ}) ∪ {ϕ}.
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(iv) if ϕ belongs to both J and J ′, then J ∩m(P ′) = (J ∩m(P )) ∪ {ϕ}
and J ′ ∩m(P ′) = (J ′ ∩m(P )) ∪ {ϕ}. From (9), ϕ /∈ J ∩m(P ) and
ϕ /∈ J ′ ∩m(P ) we obtain J ∩m(P ′) ⊃ J ′ ∩m(P ′), that is, J ≻P ′ J ′.
(v) if ϕ belongs to neither J and J ′, then J ∩m(P ′) = J ∩m(P ) and
J ′ ∩m(P ′) ⊆ J ′ ∩ m(P ), therefore J ∩ m(P ′) = J ∩m(P ) ⊂ J ′ ∩
m(P ) ⊆ J ′ ∩m(P ′), therefore, J ≻P ′ J ′.
(vi) if ϕ belongs to J but not to J ′, then J∩m(P ′) = (J∩m(P ))∪{ϕ} and
J ′ ∩m(P ′) ⊆ J ′ ∩m(P ), therefore, J ∩m(P ′) = (J ∩m(P ))∪ {ϕ} ⊃
(J ′ ∩m(P )) ∪ {ϕ} ⊇ J ′ ∩m(P ) = J ′ ∩m(P ′), that is, J ≻P ′ J ′.
(i), (ii), (v) and (vi) show that (a) holds in all cases, while (iii) and (vi) show
that (b) holds in all cases.

Proposition 8 F dH ,max and F dG,Σ satisfy monotonicity.
Proof. We say that a distance d satisfies agreement monotonicity [32] when for
all judgment sets J, J ′, J ′′ ∈ JA, (J ′′\J ′) ⊂ (J ′′\J) implies d(J ′, J ′′) ≤ d(J, J ′′).
Clearly, dH and dG are agreement monotonic [32]. Let ⋆ ∈ {
∑
,max}. For profile
P = (Ji, i ∈ N) and judgment set J , define d
⋆(J, P ) = ⋆(d(J, Ji) | i ∈ N), and
let F ⋆d the rule defined by F
⋆
d (P ) = argminJ∈JAd
⋆(J, P ).
Let d ∈ {dH , dG}. Let P = (Ji, P−i) be a profile such that ϕ ∈ J for all
J ∈ F ⋆d (P ), and P
′ = (J ′i , P−i) a ϕ-improvement of P . Let J ∈ F
⋆
d (P ) and
J ′ such that ¬ϕ ∈ J ′. Because J ′ /∈ F ⋆d (P ), we have d
⋆(J ′, P ) > d⋆(J, P ).
Since ¬ϕ ∈ Ji, ϕ ∈ J ′i , and ϕ ∈ J , by agreement monotonicity of d we have
d(J, J ′i) ≤ d(J, Ji) and d(J
′, J ′i) ≥ d(J
′, Ji). Therefore,
d⋆(J ′, P ′) ≥ d⋆(J ′, P ) > d⋆(J, P ) ≥ d⋆(J, P ′),
which shows that J ′ /∈ F ⋆d (P
′). Therefore, F ⋆d (P
′) satisfies monotonicity, and
as particular cases, F dH ,max, med and F dG,Σ satisfy monotonicity. 
Proposition 9 y satisfies monotonicity.
Proof.
Let P = (Ji, P−i), and P
′ = (J ′i , P−i) a ϕ-improvement of P , that is, (1)
P ′ = (J ′i , P−i), with J
′
i = (Ji \ {¬ϕ}) ∪ {ϕ} (and J
′
i consistent). Assume
that (2) every judgment set in y(P ) contains ϕ. Assume as well that (3) some
judgment set in y(P ′) contains ¬ϕ, which means that (4) there is a maximum
cardinality majority-consistent subprofile Q′ of P ′ such that ¬ϕ ∈ J ′ for some
J ′ ∈ ext(m(Q′)). We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: J ′i /∈ Q
′. Then Q′ is also a majority-consistent subprofile of P . Because
Q′ can be extended into a judgment set containing ¬ϕ, Q′ cannot be a maxcard
majority-consistent subprofile of P , thus (5) there exists a maxcard majority-
consistent subset U of P with |U | > |Q′|.
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Case 1.1: Ji /∈ U . Then U is also a majority-consistent subset of P ′ with
|U | > |Q′|, which contradicts (4).
Case 1.2: Ji ∈ U . Let U ′ = (U \ {Ji})∪{J ′i}. Note that U
′ is a ϕ-improvement
of U . Because of (2) and (5), we have (6) every rational extension of m(U)
contains ϕ. By point (a) of Lemma 2 applied to U , ¬ϕ /∈ m(U). Now, we apply
Lemma 1 to U . Condition (2) is impossible because ¬ϕ /∈ m(U), and condition
(3) simplifies to m(U ′) = m(U) ∪ {ϕ}; therefore, either m(U ′) = m(U) or
m(U ′) = m(U)∪{ϕ}. If m(U ′) = m(U) then trivially, U ′ is majority-consistent.
If m(U ′) = m(U) ∪ {ϕ} then applying point (b) of Lemma 2 to J = m(U), we
obtain that m(U) and m(U ′) have the same rational extensions, which in turn
implies that U ′ is majority-consistent. Thus, U ′ is a majority-consistent subset
of P ′ with |U ′| = |U | > |Q′|, which contradicts (4).
Case 2: J ′i ∈ Q
′. Let Q = (Q′ \ {J ′i}) ∪ {Ji}. Because of (4), m(Q
′) does
not contain ϕ, and because Q′ is a ϕ-improvement of Q, m(Q) does not con-
tain ϕ either, and moreover m(Q) and m(Q′) coincide on all issues other than
ϕ,¬ϕ. This implies that a rational extension J ′ of m(Q′) containing ϕ is also
a rational extension of m(Q), therefore, m(Q) is consistent and has some ra-
tional extension containing ¬ϕ. This, together with (2), implies that Q cannot
be a maxcard majority-consistent subprofile of P , that is, there is a maxcard
majority-consistent subprofile T of P such that |T | > |Q|.
Case 2.1: Ji /∈ T . Then T is also a majority-consistent subprofile of P ′, and
|T | > |Q| = |Q′|, which contradicts (4).
Case 2.2: Ji ∈ T . Let T ′ = (T \ {Ji}) ∪ {J ′i}. Similarly as in case 1.2, m(T )
and m(T ′) have the same rational extensions, and T ′ is a majority-consistent
subprofile of P ′ such that |P ′| > |Q′|, which contradicts (4).

Here come now two rather surprising results.
Proposition 10 Frev does not satisfy monotonicity.
Proof. Consider an agenda A = {p1,¬p1, . . . , p14,¬p14} and constraint γ, such
that JA contains judgment sets J1 to J29 as given in Table 11.
Consider the profile of two agents P = 〈J1, J2〉 where J1 = J1 and J2 =
J14. We obtain that Frev(P ) = {J8, J9, J10, J11}. Observe that for every
J ∈ Frev(P ), ¬p1 ∈ J . Consider the ¬p1-improvement of P , the profile
P ′ = 〈J ′1, J2〉, where J
′
1 = J
2. We now have that Frev(P
′) = {J29} and
¬p1 6∈ J29. 
Thus, Frev fails to satisfy monotonicity although, of course, the Borda rule
does satisfy it.8
8This surprising result triggers further questions: are there interesting agendas, other than
the preference agenda, for which Frev remains monotonic? Can we find a natural monotonic
extension of the Borda rule? Such intriguing questions are left for further study.
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Sets {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8, p9, p10, p11, p12, p13, p14}
J1 + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
J2 - + + + + + + + + + + + + +
J3 - - + + + + + + + + + + + +
J4 - + - + + + + + + + + + + +
J5 - + + - + + + + + + + + + +
J6 - + + + - + + + + + + + + +
J7 - + + + + - + + + + + + + +
J8 - + + + + + - + + + + + + +
J9 - + + + + + + - + + + + + +
J10 - + + + + + + + - + + + + +
J11 - + + + + + + + + - + + + +
J12 + + + + + + + + + + - - + +
J13 + + + + + + + + + + + + - -
J14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J15 + + - - - - - - - - - - - -
J16 - + - - - - - - - - - - - -
J17 - - + - - - - - - - - - - -
J18 - - - + - - - - - - - - - -
J19 - - - - + - - - - - - - - -
J20 - - - - - + - - - - - - - -
J21 - - - - - - + - - - - - + +
J22 - - - - - - - + - - - - + +
J23 - - - - - - - - + - - - + +
J24 - - - - - - - - - + - - + +
J25 - - - - - - - - - - + - - -
J26 - - - - - - - - - - - + - -
J27 - - - - - - - - - - - - + -
J28 - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
J29 + - - - - - - - - - - + + +
Table 11: Counterexample showing that Frev does not satisfying monotonicity.
Proposition 11 mpc does not satisfy monotonicity.
Proof. Consider an agenda A = {p1,¬p1, . . . , p16,¬p16} and constraint γ, such
that JA = {J1, . . . , J9} as given in Table 12.
Consider profile P = 〈J1, J2, J3〉. Let Q = 〈J1, J2, J8〉. We observe that
d(P,Q) = d(J3, J8) = 5, and that m(Q) = {J4}, therefore Q is majority-
consistent. We claim that there is no other majority-consistent profile Q′ with
d(P,Q′) ≤ 5. To check this, we first give the distances between J1, J2, J3 and
other judgement sets; they are represented in Table 13.
Now, we list all profiles such that d(P,Q′) ≤ 5. There are 10; they are
shown in Table 14, together with their distance to P and their majoritar-
ian aggregation. All of them except Q are majority-inconsistent. Therefore,
mpc(P ) = m(Q) = {J4}. Also, observe that p1 ∈ J4.
Consider now P ′ = 〈J1, J2, J9〉. Since J3 and J9 differ only on p1, P ′
is a p1-improvement of P . Now, we claim that mpc(P
′) = {J4, J5}. First,
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p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10 p11 p12 p13 p14 p15 p16
J1 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
J2 + + - - + - - + - - + - - + - -
J3 - - + - - + - - + - - + - - + -
J4 + + + - + - + + - - + + - + + -
J5 - + + - + + - + + - + + - + + -
J6 - + - - + + + + + + + + + + + +
J7 - + + + + - - + - - + - - + - -
J8 - - + - + - + + - - - + - - + -
J9 + - + - - + - - + - - + - - + -
Table 12: Counter-example showing that mpc does not satisfy monotonicity.
J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9
J1 0 10 11 6 6 3 9 10 10
J2 10 0 11 4 6 9 3 8 10
J3 11 11 0 9 5 10 10 5 1
Table 13: Distances between J1, J2, J3 and other judgement sets.
we observe that d(P ′, Q) = d(J9, J8) = 6. We show now that there are no
majority-consistent profile Q′ with d(P ′, Q′) < 6, and that there is another one
with d(P ′, Q′) = 6. To check this, we first give the distances between J9 and
each of the 9 consistent judgment sets, which are shown in Table 15.
Let us now list all profiles such that d(P ′, Q′) ≤ 6. There are 14 of them:
all those that satisfied d(P,Q′)≤ 5, and four more that are shown in Table 16.
We conclude that there are exactly two consistent profiles at distance 6 from
P ′: Q and 〈J6, J7, J9〉. Therefore, mpc(P ′) = {J4, J5}. Now, ¬p1 ∈ J5, which
shows that mpc does not satisfy monotonicity. 
Q′ d(P,Q′) maj(Q′)
P 0 + + +− ++− ++− ++− ++−
Q 5 J4
〈J1, J2, J5〉 5 + + +− ++− ++− ++− ++−
〈J1, J2, J9〉 1 + + +− ++− ++− ++− ++−
〈J1, J7, J3〉 3 − +++ ++− ++− ++− ++−
〈J1, J7, J9〉 4 + + ++ ++− ++− ++− ++−
〈J1, J4, J3〉 4 + + +− +++ ++− ++− ++−
〈J1, J4, J9〉 5 + + +− +++ ++− ++− ++−
〈J6, J2, J3〉 3 − +−− ++− ++− ++− ++−
〈J6, J2, J9〉 4 + +−− ++− ++− ++− ++−
Table 14: All the profiles at distances 5 or less from P .
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J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8 J9
J9 10 10 1 8 6 11 11 6 0
Table 15: Distances between J9 and each of the 9 consistent judgment sets.
Q′ d(P ′, Q′) maj(Q′)
〈J6, J7, J9〉 6 J5
〈J4, J2, J9〉 6 + + +− +−− +−− ++− ++−
〈J1, J5, J9〉 6 + + +− ++− ++− ++− ++−
〈J5, J2, J9〉 6 + + +− ++− ++− ++− ++−
Table 16: There are 14 profiles at distance 6 or less from P ′: four profiles from
this table and all those from Table 14.
6.3 Reinforcement
A social preference function F satisfies reinforcement if whenever two profiles
over disjoint electorates have some output rankings in common, then the profiles
obtained by merging the two electorates leads to elect those rankings that are
obtained for both profiles. This easily generalizes to judgment aggregation rules
as follows.
Definition 12 For every two profiles P = 〈J1, . . . , Jn〉 and Q = 〈Jn+1, . . . , Jq〉,
we denote P + Q = 〈J1, . . . , Jq〉. We say that a judgment aggregation rule F
satisfies reinforcement when for every agenda A, and every two profiles P and
Q over disjoint electorates, if F (P )∩F (Q) 6= ∅ then F (P +Q) = F (P )∩F (Q).
Young and Levenglick’s theorem [35] tells us that among social preference
functions Kemeny’s rule is the unique Condorcet extension satisfying neutrality
and reinforcement. As a consequence, if a judgment aggregation rule is majority-
preserving and if its application to a preference agenda defines a neutral social
preference function, then this SPF has to be Kemeny’s rule.
Corollary 2 mc, mcc, ra, leximax, mpc and y do not satisfy reinforcement.
The following result does not come as a surprise, as reinforcement is the key
property of scoring voting rules:
Proposition 12 All scoring rules satisfy reinforcement.
Proof. Let Fs be the scoring rule based on some scoring function s. Let P and Q
be two profiles over disjoint electorates and assume that Fs(P )∩Fs(Q) 6= ∅. Let
J ∈ Fs(P ) ∩ Fs(Q). Then s(J, P ) ≥ s(J
′, P ) and s(J,Q) ≥ s(J ′, Q) for all J ′,
therefore, s(J, P +Q) = s(J, P ) + s(J,Q) ≥ s(J ′, P ) + s(J ′, Q) = s(J ′, P +Q),
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which shows that J ∈ Fs(P + Q). Conversely, let J ′ /∈ Fs(P ) ∩ Fs(Q). With-
out loss of generality, assume J ′ /∈ Fs(P ). Then, for every J ∈ Fs(P ) ∩ Fs(Q)
we have s(J, P ) > s(J ′, P ), therefore s(J ′, P + Q) = s(J ′, P ) + s(J ′, Q) >
s(J, P ) + s(J,Q) = s(J, P +Q), which shows that J ′ /∈ Fs(P +Q). 
Corollary 3 med and Frev satisfy reinforcement.
Proposition 13 F dG,Σ satisfies reinforcement.
The proof is similar to the proof above for scoring rules, replacing scores by
distances and maximization by minimization. It would work more generally for
every rule minimising the sum of distances to judgment sets.
Proposition 14 F dH ,max does not satisfy reinforcement.
Proof. Let [A] = {p, q, r}, γ = ⊤, P = 〈{p, q, r}, {¬p,¬q,¬r}〉 and Q =
〈{¬p, q, r}〉. F dH ,max(P ) = {{¬p, q, r}, {p,¬q, r}, {p, q,¬r}, {¬p,¬q, r},
{¬p, q,¬r}, {¬p,¬q, r}} and F dH ,max(Q) = {{¬p, q, r}}, therefore
F dH ,max(P ) ∩ F dH ,max(Q) = F dH ,max(Q) 6= ∅. However, F dH ,max(P + Q) =
F dH ,max(P ). 
A similar negative result holds more generally for every rule minimising the
maximum of distances to judgment sets. However, such rules, including F dH ,max,
satisfy this weak version of reinforcement: if F dH ,max(P )∩F dH ,max(Q) 6= ∅, then
F dH ,max(P +Q) ∩ (F dH ,max(P ) ∩ F dH ,max(Q)) 6= ∅.
6.4 Homogeneity
Let us write kP for P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
, where + has been defined in Subsection 6.3.
Definition 13 A judgment aggregation rule F satisfies homogeneity when for
every JA-profile P and positive integer k, it holds that F (kP ) = F (P ).
Homogeneity being weaker than reinforcement, we already know that it is
satisfied by all scoring functions (including med and Frev) and by F
dG,Σ.
Proposition 15 Every judgment aggregation rule based on the majority set
satisfies homogeneity.
Proof. Let F be a judgment aggregation rule based on majority set. Since for
every profile P and every k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} we have that m(P ) = m(kP ) then
F (P ) = F (kP ). 
Corollary 4 mc and mcc satisfy homogeneity.
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Proposition 16 ra and leximax satisfy homogeneity.
Proof. ra(P ) is fully determined by the weak order onA induced by the values of
N(P, .). Since for every k ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and every ϕ, ψ ∈ A, N(kP, ϕ) ≥ N(kP, ψ)
if and only if N(P, ϕ) ≥ N(P, ψ), we have ra(P ) = ra(kP ). The same proof
works also for leximax. 
Proposition 17 y does not satisfy homogeneity.
Proof. This is a consequence of the fact that the Young voting rule does not
satisfy homogeneity (see Example 2 in [34]). 
Proposition 18 mpc does not satisfy homogeneity.
Proof. Consider the profile P from Table 17. We have mpc(P ) = {{¬(p ∧
Voters p ∧ r p ∧ s q p ∧ q
J1, J2, J3 + + + +
J4, J5, J6 + + - -
J7 − J10 - - + -
J11 - - - -
m(P ) + + + -
Table 17: Profile showing that mpc does not satisfy homogeneity.
r),¬(p∧ s), q,¬(p∧ q)}, {(p∧ r), (p∧ s),¬q,¬(p∧ q)}}. Consider now the profile
P ′ = 2P = P + P . We have mpc(P ′) = {{¬(p ∧ r),¬(p ∧ s), q,¬(p ∧ q)}}. 
Proposition 19 For every distance d, F d,max satisfies homogeneity.
Proof. For every profile P , judgment set J , and positive integer k, we have
max
Ji∈kP
d(J, Ji) = max
Ji∈P
d(J, Ji). The result follows. 
As a consequence, F dH ,max satisfies homogeneity.
7 Summary
We have listed a number of existing judgment aggregation rules, and for a
number of important properties we have identified those rules that satisfy it.
These properties come in four groups: (1) majority-preservation; (2) weak and
strong unanimity; (3) monotonicity, and (4) reinforcement and homogeneity
(weaker than reinforcement). Our results are summarized in Table 18.
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Property mc mcc ra leximax med mpc y F dG,Σ F dH ,max Frev
Majority Preservation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no
Weak Unanimity yes no yes yes no no yes no no no
Strong Unanimity no no yes yes no no yes no no no
Monotonicity yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes no
Homogeneity yes yes yes yes yes no no yes yes yes
Reinforcement no no no no yes no no yes no∗ yes
Table 18: Summary of rules and properties they (do not) satisfy.
We may use this table to derive a tentative dominance relation between
rules. Let P be the set of properties considered here, that is, P = {majority
preservation, weak unanimity, strong unanimity, monotonicity, reinforcement,
homogeneity }. Say that a rule F P-dominates a rule F ′ when the set of
properties in P satisfied by F strictly contains the set of properties in P satisfied
by F ′. (Of course, this is somewhat arbitrary because many other properties
could have been considered; but still, these are among the most important
properties.) Then:
• ra and leximax P-dominate mc, mcc, mpc and y;
• med P-dominates mcc, Frev, mpc, F dG,Σ and F dH ,max.
This leaves us with three P-undominated rules, coming in two groups: med,
and the very closely related rules ra and leximax. Given the importance of
the median rule, which generalizes the Kemeny rule, it should not come as a
surprise that med performs well. The presence of ra and leximax on this
podium is somewhat more surprising.
Some rules have been left out of this study. Importantly, we did not consider
quota-based rules, because the quota has to be chosen depending on the agenda
to ensure that the judgment sets are consistent, which prevents the use of a
quota-based rule in an agenda-independent way. This is even more patent for
premise-based and conclusion-based rules.
Finally, a challenging question is the axiomatization of some judgment ag-
gregation rules, or some families of rules, for which our work can be seen as a
very first (and very incomplete) step.9
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.
Many of the non-inclusion relationships can be derived from the profile of our
running example, introduced in Example 2, and used again in Example 3 for
mcc and mc, Example 4 for med, Example 5 for ra and leximax, Example
6 for y, and Example 7 for mpc. This profile already shows that mc 6⊆ mcc,
mc 6⊆ med, mc 6⊆ ra, mc 6⊆ leximax, y 6⊆ ra, y 6⊆ leximax, that med and ra
are incomparable, as well as med and leximax, that y and each of mc, mcc,
med are incomparable, and that mpc is incompatible with each of y, ra, and
leximax.
The inclusion relationships mcc ⊆ mc, leximax ⊆ ra are clear from their
definitions, and a proof that med ⊆ mc can be found in [28].
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We now prove what remains to be proven:
1. ra ⊆ mc: If J ∈ ra(P ) then, by definition of ra, J ∩m(P ) is a maximal
consistent subset of m(P ), thus J ∈ mc(P ).
2. ra 6⊆ leximax: Consider the profile P in Table 19.
Voters p ∧ q p q p ∧ r q ∧ r s
J1 − J5 - + - + - +
J6 − J10 - - + - + -
J11 − J14 + + + + + +
J15 + + + - - -
m(P ) - + + + + +
Table 19: A profile showing that ra 6⊆ leximax.
ra(P ) = {{p∧q, p, q, p∧r, q∧r, s}, {¬(p∧q), p,¬q, p∧r,¬(q∧r), s}{¬(p∧
q),¬p, q,¬(p∧r), q∧r, s}} and leximax(P ) = {{p∧q, p, q, p∧r, q∧r, s}}.
3. med 6⊆ mcc: Consider the example from Table 6. We have mcc(P ) =
{¬p, p → (q ∨ r),¬p,¬r, p → (s ∨ t),¬s,¬t, p → (u ∨ v),¬u,¬v} and
{p, p→ (q ∨ r),¬q, r, p→ (s ∨ t),¬s, t, p→ (u ∨ v),¬u, v} ∈ med(P ).
4. ra and leximax are incomparable with mcc.
Consider again the example from Table 6. mcc(P ) = {{¬p, p → (q ∨
r),¬p,¬r, p → (s ∨ t),¬s,¬t}, p→ (u ∨ v),¬u,¬v} and for every J ∈
ra(P ), and a fortiori for every J ∈ ra(P ), p ∈ J . Thus mcc 6⊆ ra
and leximax 6⊆ mcc.
5. ra 6⊆ y: Consider the example from Table 20. The minimal number of
Voters {p, q, p ∧ q, r, s, r ∧ s, t}
J1 + + + - + - +
J2, J3, J4 + + + - + - -
J5 − J8 + + + + - - -
J9, J10 + - - + - - -
J11 − J14 + - - + + + +
J15 − J18 - + - + + + +
Rule {p, q, p ∧ q, r, s, r ∧ s, t}
ra(P ) + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + -
y(P ) + + + + + + +
Table 20: A profile showing that ra 6⊆ y.
voters to remove to make the profile majority-consistent is two. These
two voters are the two voters of the fourth row (light gray shaded). We
have y(P ) = {{p, q, p ∧ q, r, s, r ∧ s, t}} and ra(P ) = {{p, q, p ∧ q, r, s, r ∧
s, t}, {p, q, p ∧ q, r, s, r ∧ s,¬t}}. Thus, ra 6⊆ y.
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6. mpc is incomparable with mc: Consider the pre-agenda [A] = {p, q, p ∧
q, p ∧ ¬q ∧ r, α1, α2,¬p ∧ q ∧ s, α3, α4, α5, α6, α7}, where
α1 = p ∧ ¬q ∧ r ∧ ¬q, α2 = p ∧ ¬q ∧ r ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬q, α3 = q ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬p ∧ s,
α4 = q ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬p ∧ s, α5 = (p ↔ q) ∧ t, α6 = (p ↔ q) ∧ t ∧ t and
α7 = (p↔ q) ∧ t ∧ t ∧ t. Let P be the profile from Table 21.
Voters {p, q, p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q ∧ r, α1, α2, ¬p ∧ q ∧ s, α3, α4, α5, α6, α7}
J1 + + + - - - - - - + + +
J2 + - - + + + - - - - - -
J3 - + - - - - + + + - - -
m(P ) + + - - - - - - - - - -
Table 21: A profile P showing that mpc inc mc.
We obtain
mc(P ) ={
{p, q, p ∧ q, ¬(p ∧ ¬q ∧ r), ¬α1, ¬α2, ¬(¬p ∧ q ∧ s), ¬α3, ¬α4, ¬α5, ¬α6, ¬α7}
{p, ¬q, ¬(p ∧ q), ¬(p ∧ ¬q ∧ r), ¬α1, ¬α2, ¬(¬p ∧ q ∧ s), ¬α3, ¬α4, ¬α5, ¬α6, ¬α7}
{¬p, q, ¬(p ∧ q), ¬(p ∧ ¬q ∧ r), ¬α1, ¬α2, ¬(¬p ∧ q ∧ s), ¬α3, ¬α4, ¬α5, ¬α6, ¬α7}
}
Voters {p, q, p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q ∧ r, α1, α2, ¬p ∧ q ∧ s, α3, α4, α5, α6, α7}
J1 - - - - - - - - - + + +
J2 + - - + + + - - - - - -
J3 - + - - - - + + + - - -
m(Q) - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 22: A profile Q at a minimal DH sitance from P in Table 21. Colouered
are the cells with the judgments reversed from P
To obtain mpc(P ), we need to change the first three judgments of the
first voter, obtaining the profile Q given in Table 22. This is the minimal
change, since if either the second or the third agent change either their
judgment on p or their judgment on q, they have to change additional other
three judgments. We obtain mpc(P ) = {{¬p,¬q,¬(p ∧ q),¬(p ∧ ¬q ∧
r),¬α1,¬α2,¬(p∧ q ∧ s),¬α3,¬α4,¬α5,¬α6,¬α7}}. Thus, mc inc mpc.
7. mpc is incomparable with mcc: Consider the profile P from Table 23.
We have mpc(P ) = {{¬(p ∧ r),¬(p ∧ s), q,¬(p ∧ q)}} and mcc(P ) =
{{p∧r, p∧s,¬q,¬(p∧q)}, {p∧r, p∧s, q, p∧q}}; thus mpc(P )∩mcc(P ) = ∅.
8. mpc inc med: Consider the pre-agenda [A] = {p, q, p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q, α1, α2, q∧
¬p, α3, α4}, where α1 = p∧¬q∧¬q, α2 = p∧¬q∧¬q∧¬q, α3 = q∧¬p∧¬p
and α4 = q ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬p.
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Voters p ∧ r p ∧ s q p ∧ q
J1 − J6 + + + +
J7 − J12 + + - -
J13 − J20 - - + -
J21, J22 - - - -
m(P ) + + + -
Table 23: A profile showing that mpc does not satisfy homogeneity.
Voters {p, q, p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q, α1, α2, q ∧ ¬p, α3, α4}
J1 + + + - - - - - -
J2 + - - + + + - - -
J3 - + - - - - + + +
Rules {p, q, p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q, α1, α2, q ∧ ¬p, α3, α4}
mpc - - - - - - - - -
med + + + - - - - - -
Table 24: A profile showing that mpc inc med.
We obtain mpc(P ) by changing the first three judgments of the first voter.
This is the minimal change, since if either the second or the third agent
change either their judgment on p or their judgment on q, they have
to change additional other three judgments. Observe that med(P ) =
{{p, q, p∧ q,¬(p∧¬q),¬α1,¬α2,¬(q∧¬p),¬α3,¬α4}} since for this judg-
ment set the weight is 17, and for the remaining three other possible judg-
ment sets the weights are: 14 for the set of the judgment sets of the second,
and third voter and 16 for the judgment set
{¬p,¬q,¬(p ∧ q),¬(p ∧ ¬q),¬α1,¬α2,¬(q ∧ ¬p),¬α3,¬α4}.
Thus mpc inc med.
9. F dH ,max, Frev and F
dG,Σ are pairwise incomparable: We give one coun-
terexample for all three pairs. Let AC be the preference agenda for the
set of alternatives C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}, together with the transitivity con-
straint. Consider the profile given in Table 25. The collective judgments
obtained by Frev, F
dG,Σ, and F dH ,max are represented in the last five rows
of this table.
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Voters c1Pc2 c1Pc3 c1Pc4 c2Pc3 c2Pc4 c3Pc4
J1 + + + - - -
J2, J3 - + + + + +
Rule c1Pc2 c1Pc3 c1Pc4 c2Pc3 c2Pc4 c3Pc4
Frev(〈J1, J2, J3〉) + + + + + +
F dG,Σ(〈J1, J2, J3〉) - + + + + +
F dH ,max(〈J1, J2, J3〉) + + + - + +
+ + + + - +
+ + + + + -
Table 25: A profile showing that F dH ,max, Frev and F
dG,Σ are mutually incom-
parable.
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